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only prevention or remedy. Assuming that the federal courts had no
constitutional authority for their stand, and no justification except
that the interest of the public demanded the abrogation of a strict rule
of evidence their position would not be open to attack. However the
federal rule, being based upon fundamental constitutional rights and
the necessity of preserving those rights to the people of the U. S., is
fast meeting with the approval of state courts of last resort.
WnMLz HUm.
-ADISSILRIT OF EVIDENCE ILLEGALY SEIZED-(AFFRLATIVE VIEW).
-Defendant was charged with keeping and exposing for sale intoxicat-
ing liquors. Before the trial he filed a petition for the return of two
bottles of whisky taken from him by an officer without a warrant,
which was denied. On the trial the defendant objected to the ad-
mis§ion of the liquor in evidence on the ground that it was
illegally seized. The objection was overruled. This ruling was sus-
tained by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts which held
that the competency of evidence is determined by its inherent pro-
bative value rather than upon outside circumstances. Commonwealth
v. Wilkins, 243 Mass. 356, 138 N. E. 11 (1923).
Briefly, the question raised is the admissibility in a criminal case
of evidence illegally seized for the purpose of convicting the owner of
that evidence.
The federal rule, as enunciated in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S.
616 (1885); "We 7s v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914); and Gouled
v. United States, 255 U. S. 298 (1921), is-where the federal govern-
ment or its agencies has obtained possession of property of a defendant
thru an unlawful search and seizure, and such defendant has made a
timely demand for the return thereof, which demand has been denied,
such property cannot be used in evidence against him without a viola-
tion of the fourth and fifth ammentments to the federal constitution.
This is called the federal exclusion rule.
The emphatic stand of the Kentucky courts is clearly established
by the decision in "Walters v. Commonwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 25& S. W.
839 (1923), where it was held that the admission of evidence under
the above circumstances was violative of the state constitutional pro-
visions against unreasonable search and seizure and compulsory self-
incrimination.
It is the purpose of this note to briefly state the law in those juris-
dictions where the federal exclusion rule is rejected and to attempt to
show wherein those jurisdictions have the preferable rule.
The law in those courts that admit evidence illegally seized is
very well settled. The contentions they make are that the admission
of evidence is not affected by the way it was obtained, whether lawful
or unlawful, that it is not violative of the constitutidn, and that the
tried and established rules of evidence support their holdings. People
v. Defore, 242 N. Y. 13, 150 N. E. 585 (1926). Where defendant's room
was searched without a warrant for a stolen overcoat and a blackjack
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was found, for which defendant was indicted. State v. Black et al.,
(N. J.) 135 AUt. 685 (1926). Where books of a corporation were seized
unlawfully and defendants were indicted for conspiracy. Common-
wealth v. Hunsinger, 290 Pa. 185, 138 Atl. 683 (1927). Where intoxicat-
ing liquor was seized under an invalid search warrant and defendant
was indicted for the possession of it. People v. Mayen, 188 Cal. 237,
205 Pac. 435 (1922). Where papers and other articles were seized
under an improper search warrant and defendant was indicted for an
attempt to commit larceny.
This was undoubtedly settled as the correct rule of evidence both
In England and the United States prior to the appearance of the i.l-
starred Boyd case, which introduced a novel doctrine into the law of
evidence. Legatt v. Tollervey, 14 East 302 (1811); Commonwealth v.
Danza, (Mass.) 2 Met. 329 (1841); Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. 4, Sec.
2184. The rule had been followed for almost a century since the adop-
tion of the constitution. The fourth and fifth amendments were recog-
nized as operative; yet, until the introduction of the rule in this and
subsequent cases, it was never doubted that the admission of evidence
illegally seized was not a violation of either. 19 Il!. Law Review 303.
It was almost thirty years later that this doctrine was first followed
by the court that created it. Weeks v. United States, supra. Mean-
while, it was practically repudiated by Adams v. New York, 192 U. S.
585 (1904).
Now, since this is a novel doctrine that seeks both to alter a funda-
mental rule of evidence and to give a meaning to two of our constitu-
tional amendments heretofore not attributed to them, it is altogether
fitting and proper that we understand the impelling reasons for this
radical move.
There are two broad grounds used fo support the federal exclusion
rule. First, there is the practical argument; or the consequences that
would ensue if the rule were otherwise. Second, there is the constitu-
tional argument; or the contention that a different ruling would violate
the search and seizure amendment or the self-incriminatory amend-
ment or both.
Dealing with the first contention, we find the courts arguing to the
effect that it would break down and shatter on the rocks the fundamen-
tal principles and inalienable rights that we have sought so long to
keep as the most sacred and cherished possessions of society; that if
the federal exclusion rule were not adopted the secrecy and privacy of
the home could no longer be maintained, and the age-old tradition that
"a man's home is his castle" would no longer remain fixed in the hearts
of mankind as the most comforting security. Youman v. Common-
wealth, 189 Ky. 152, 224 S. W. 860 (1920). Professor Wigmore calls
this "misguided sentimentality." Sec. 2184.
As a matter of fact if the federal exclusion rule is adopted for this
purpose the principle that "the means adopted should be adapted to
the end sought" is not being followed, for it does not cure the evil-
The officer is not punished by permitting the criminal to go free. If
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the high-handed policeman gloats in rampaging thru a man's house
under apparent color of authority, it is no deterrent to him that thp
conviction fails by virtue of his unlawful act. We should remedy the
situation, not by creating another evil, but by appropriate legislation
to destroy it directly.
Even the federal courts will admit the evidence if there is a valid
search warrant. They do not, in their argument as to the practical
consequences, go behind the issuance of the search warrant and letj
the test be probable cause for the issuance of it. The small amount
of probable cause required to evade the rule permits the same evil to
remain. "A Critique of the Carroll Case," 29 Columbia Law Review
1068.
If it is the right of the citizens to remain secure in their homes
and not have their privacy disturbed by officers of the law that the
courts seek to protect, why is it then "they are not so scrupulous about
evidence brought to them by others"? People v. Defore, supra. Bur-
deau v. McDowell, 256 U. S. 465 (1921). Where a private detective
seized the evidence illegally for the purpose of using it for prosecution
in a criminal case. Schroeder v. U. S., 7 Fed. (2d) 60 (1925). Where
a city policeman procured liquor from a car without a search warrant
or probable cause. In both of these cases the court admitted the evi-
dence.
Thus, having disposed of the practical argument, we will look to
the contention that the admission of such evidence would be unconsti-
tutional. The Boyd case said that the fourth and fifth amendments
should be construed together, and that each was to throw light on the
other in the interpretation of both. This seems to be a hard doctrine
to support. First, let us look to the history behind the two amend-
ments. The basis for the fourth was an outgrowth of the protest in
Massachusetts against the Payton Case. Quincy, Mass. Reports 51
(1761), where it was held that general writs or "writs of assistance"
might be legally granted, and the officers might, by that authority,
search houses at will. This doctrine was also in question in Entick v.
Carrington, 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 (1765) where the issuance of general
search warrants was held to be illegal. The provision against self-
incrimination, however, was embodied in the law before this time. It
had its origin in the opposition by the law courts in England to the
'ex-officio' oath of the ecclesistical courts during the 16th and 17th cen-
tury. It was passed on in Liburn's Trial, 3 How. St. Tr. 1315 (1636-
1645) where it was held that defendant was not obliged to take an oath
which would force him to answer all questions asked him. Wigmore
on Evidence, Sec. 2250. It will also be observed that the fourth amend-
ment is composed exclusively of the provision against unreasonable
search and seizure and requisites for a warrant to search, while there
are five distinct provisions in the fifth amendment. It would seem
very logical that had the framers of the constitution intended that the
self-incrimination clause be construed along with the search and seizure
provision, they would have made it a part of that amendment rather
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than inserted it into another amendment the provisions of which did
not so strikingly "throw light on and help to interpret it."
It is illogical to suppose that these two amendments can be con-
strued together. Wigmore on Evidence, See. 2264, p. 868. One is
designated to protect an accused against compulsory testimony against
himself in a criminal trial, and the other to punish the wrongful inva-
sion of the home or unwarranted seizure of property, and render
invalid legislation or judicial decisions having such effect. Lawrence
v. State, 103 Md. 17, 63 AtI. 96, 104 (1906).
We will now attempt to show that the self-incrimination clause is
not violated by the admission of evidence illegally seized. There is a
direct split of authority as to whether this clause applies to evidence
other than strictly testimonial acts of the defendant. Banks v. State,
207 Ala. 179, 93 So. 293 (1922) says that it does not. Blum v. Statej
94 Md. 375, 51 AtI. 26 (1902) says that it does. It would seem tho,
that to hold that it is self-incrimination to give as evidence property
of the defendant illegally seized would be to give a construction to
that provision that it does not merit.
Everyone will admit that the property, if procured legally, would
not be inadmissible. Is it any the less incriminatory, any the less
involuntarily given, or any the less the property of the accused to
admit it in those cases? People v. Defore, supra, p. 589. As already
shown, the courts will admit the evidence if seized illegally by private
persons. What is the difference between an officer acting wholly outside
his authority and a private citizen? They are subject to the same
actions. They have committed the same act. Since the seizure is in no
way authorized by the government it cannot be deemed as committed
by it. The officer is no longer an agent of the state, but a private tres-
passer. He, and not the government is responsible for that trespass.
Commonwealth v. Wilkins, supra, p. 13. The use of such evidence might
be as injurious to the accused as a confession forced from him by tor-
ture, but since the constitutional provision is not violated the injurious
consequences are not to be taken into consideration. Commonwealth
v. Dabbicenio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 Atl. 679 (1927); Commonwealth v. Hun-
singer, 290 Pa. 185, 138 AtI. 683 (1927). Hence, "documents or chattels
obtained from the person's control without the use of process against
him as a witness are not in the scope of the privilege." Wigmore on
Evidence, see. 2264, p. 865.
Let us now observe the other constitutional provision, which Is an
immunity against unreasonable search and seizure. Even less, can it
be argued that the admission of evidence illegally seized is a violation
of this amendment. First, looking at the context of the amendment
itself, the provision is against unreasonable rather than illegal search
and seizure. Unreasonable means not according to reason, while
illegal means not according to law. A search and seizure might
be absolutely unreasonable and be at the same time according
to law, were it not for this amendment. Hence, it would seem
apparent that the purpose of this amendment was to prevent the
K. L. J.-12
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
agencies of the government from making legal searches and seizures
that are unreasonable. It seems as tho this must necessarily be the
extent of the immunity. People v. Mayen, 205 Pac. 435, p. 441. By
the federal exclusion rule a double immunity is given the people. One
against the legalization of a trespass, and the other affecting a rule of
evidence. There is no provision that after the trespass is committed
the evidence obtained in the course of the illegal act shall ;aot bd
admitted. 19 Ill. Law Review 307. It might be urged that the admis-
sion of the evidence condones the method of obtaining it. But how
can we sustain this argument in the face of the fact that the same
court will subsequently prosecute the officer for the illegal act and will
not recognize as a defense that the evidence was admitted in a prior
trial. The trespass is complete when the property is seized. The
government is not committing an illegal act. The individual is the
offender. "A criminal prosecution is more than a game In which the
government may be checkmated and the game lost merely because its
officers have not played according to rule." McGuire v. United, States,
273 U. S. 95, 99 (1927).
Finally, there is the fact that the federal exclusion rule violates a
rule of evidence, in permitting improper grounds for objections. State
v. Fahm, 53 N. D. 203, 205 N. W. 67, 69 (1925). This is not denied by
the courts that support the exclusion rule, and is affirmed by all the
great authorities on evidence. Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 2183, and
Greenleaf on Evidence, sec. 254a. It would appear then that the courts
would entertain some hesitancy in openly violating the rules of pro-
cedure laid down for them both by the common law and by their codes.
In light of the procedure in the federal courts and in those state
courts that adopt the exclusion rule, is it not strange that the greai
mass of laymen wonder at the total inadequacy of the American legal
system to cope with the present day prevalence of crime? It may be
that the constitutional guarantees discussed in this paper have yielded
benefits that were not deserved. "Neither of the amendments had a
genesis that can be said to have been prophetic of the great repute
they have come to enjoy. My impression is, that so many have been
the criminals who have worshipped at the shrine of the amendments,
and so seldom have honest and law-ablding men had occasion to seek
their protection, that their adulation by the law-breaker has given the
people at large a false conception of their proper breadth and com-
pass." Jno. C. Knott, 74 Pa. Law Review 141.
We must be cautious in granting a creature powers that will enable
it to be a thorn in the side of its creator, and vigilant to forestall a
protector against wielding a sword that wounds its master.
JAB. T. HATCEOM
CRIMEs-DUTY TO RETREAT "To THE WArt".-In the Kentucky case
of Gibson v. Com wnwealth, A was killed in a drunken brawl. B and
C along with D were convicted of manslaughter. The decision of the
134 S. W. 926 (1931).
